Article: The hazards of “Stuff” in the cockpit.

Managing the risk of helicopter flight requires that we see and understand the threats it poses. Currently the threats revealed in helicopter accident investigations are not practically accessible to the people that need it: the pilots.

This article explores the serious safety risks posed by unsecured items – “stuff” – in helicopter cockpits. Drawing on accident investigations, it shows how loose or poorly secured objects can obstruct controls or distract pilots mid-flight, sometimes with disastrous consequences. The article provides practical guidance on ensuring the stuff you take into the cockpit doesn’t become a flight hazard.

The hazards of “Stuff” in the cockpit.

As helicopter pilots we take paraphernalia – lets call it stuff – with us into the cockpit. Stuff to transport, stuff needed during flight. We might love the helicopter we fly but that feeling is sorely tested when it comes to the provision of places to put our stuff. A slim elasticated door pocket or a gap between the right seat and the door are not exactly ideal. An empty left hand seat is hardly the most secure storage space and a passenger doesn’t always take kindly to being asked to hold a map, jerry can or penguin (… read on).

But we have to make do with what we have – a confined space, several sensitive controls and a bunch of stuff – and in making do we can run in to problems.

Unsurprisingly, the problems arise from the pilot not attempting to secure an object in the cockpit or from failing to do so effectively. The object shifts in flight and one of two paths lead to an accident:

1) Control movement is inhibited by the object, directly causing loss of control.

Case 1.           Whilst stopping en route for fuel the R22 pilot agreed to deliver a box and stowed it unsecured on top of a jerry can already on the passenger seat. On approach to land the box fell forward onto luggage in the footwell and restricted movement of the (permanently installed) dual cyclic control. The pilot was then unable to manoeuvre the R22 to prevent the tail rotor hitting a cattle crate stand. The helicopter landed heavily on its skids.

Case 2.           On approach to the hover in an R22 the pilot commenced a turn to the right and an “unsecured object” shifted, preventing movement of the cyclic control to the left. The aircraft continued to roll right until the main rotor blades hit the ground. The aircraft came to rest on its left side.

Case 3.            The pilot was using the R22 in a mustering operation. The left door had been removed and an empty jerry can was secured on the left seat using the seat belt. With the R22 at about 10ft AGL a gust of wind blew through the left door opening causing the jerry can to jam the cyclic control by wedging between it and the seat. The front of the skids hit the ground starting a crash sequence that ended in the helicopter coming to rest inverted.

Case 4.            On approach to land the pilot noticed that the GPS aerial had fallen into the footwell next to the tail rotor control pedals. As he brought the R22 to the hover he was unable to push the left pedal. The helicopter rotated rapidly right, completing 3 revolutions before impacting the ground. The report concludes that all indications were that a foreign object had obstructed the pedals. As well as the GPS aerial, 3 rifle cartridge shells and a water bottle were found and may have obstructed the pedals.

Case 5.            The R44 RII had a pilot and three passengers on board. One of the passengers was a specialist, there to conduct an aerial survey of an island with a large seabird population. Following the survey the R44 landed on the island and the specialist requested that they transport a penguin back to the point of departure aerodrome. The passenger seated on the left front seat placed a cardboard box containing the penguin on his lap and secured it with his hands. The R44 lifted off and whilst transitioning and about 15 metres above ground level the cardboard box slid off to the right and onto the pilot’s cyclic control. Because of this the cyclic control advanced to the far-right position and the helicopter rolled to the right. The main rotor blades struck the ground and the helicopter impacted the ground on its starboard side approximately 20m from the point of lift-off. None of the occupants, including the penguin, were injured.

2) Loss of control happens when the pilot attempts to secure a shifting object.

Here the accidents are more complex as the shifting object is not an immediate threat but gives ample scope for pilot distraction and error.

Case 6.           The R44 had just landed and was due to take off again for a circuit (pattern). The pilot noticed that his jacket on the front left seat had moved and was next to the open vent of the front left door. He was concerned that the jacket may be sucked out of the vent so reached out to move it. As he pulled on the jacket it raised the left collective lever, the helicopter pitched nose up (the stinger hit the ground), yawed left then rolled right, coming to rest on its right side. The pilot had not applied collective friction as it was his intention to take off again after securing his jacket. The report suggests that the left yaw was caused by the pilot inadvertently pushing left pedal as he reached across the cockpit to retrieve the jacket. 

Case 7.           The R22 was on a ferry flight with an overnight bag on the passenger seat and a swag (a waterproof shelter used for sleeping outdoors) and fuel pump leaned against the seat. All were secured – at least an attempt had been made to secure them – with the seat belt. The swag shifted during flight and came to rest against the cyclic control causing minor control interference. The pilot commented later that at this point this was “an annoying but not a serious problem.” The pilot unfastened the seat belt in order to reposition the swag and it fell onto the collective pushing it nearly all the way down. The R22 was now descending out of control as the collective lever and cyclic were obstructed. The helicopter landed heavily and rolled. The report concludes that “the pilot made an inappropriate decision to re-adjust the swag in flight.”

Case 8.           The pilot of the R44 stowed his map between his seat and the door and as he brought the aircraft to the hover the map fell into the footwell. He instinctively lent forward to pick it up and in doing so moved the cyclic causing the aircraft to lurch to the right and the map to slip under the pedals. The pilot panicked, pushed down on the left pedal (possibly in a learned response from driving a car) and landed the aircraft whilst it was rotating rapidly. This caused damage to the airframe and engine controls.

Safety Lessons:

The Cases above tell us that helicopter pilots should consider anything brought into the cockpit as a potential flight hazard. Most of the time we get away with loose objects. But not always. The Cases teach us how to reduce the risk they pose.

Stow items not needed during flight in the under-seat baggage compartments (Cases 1-3,6,7).

About to put any item into the cockpit? First ask this question: Do I need it during the flight? If it’s a firm “no” then put it under a seat. And follow the POH guidance when doing this: (i) Don’t overload the compartments:  No more than 50lb (23kg) of baggage in any single under-seat compartment. (ii) Spread the weight:  Load compartments below non-occupied seats in preference to those under occupied seats (iii) Nothing solid:  The items should be crushable to allow the designed collapse of the seat structure in a heavy landing. (iv) Remember the weight is there:  The under-seat items contribute to the weight limit for that seat. So if you’ve fully loaded an under-seat compartment the maximum weight of a person on that seat is reduced to 190 lb in the R22 and 250 lb in the R44.

And when stowing small items under the seat a degree of caution is still required. In one instance a pilot’s mobile phone ‘migrated’ during flight from the baggage area under the R22 right seat to the area under the carburettor heat control and hour meter panel (1).

Only put items on the left seat or in the left footwell if the adjacent vent door is closed and all of the dual controls are removed (Cases 1,6).

Also, RHC Safety Notice SN-30 warns of items being sucked out of a door vent and potentially damaging the tail rotor (2).

The cyclic is vulnerable to obstruction even with the dual cyclic control removed (Cases 2,3,5,7).

It’s easy to think all is good once the dual controls are removed. But not necessarily. The cyclic is still vulnerable to interference. And wrapping the seat belt around an item or holding it tightly is not always enough to prevent this. If the item is too big or not appropriate for under seat storage then tie it down properly. And test the security. Will it move with a sudden pitch or roll?

Seek expert advice before transporting animals (Case 5)

I’m no veterinarian but it would seem to me that a small animal should be in suitably sized, robust and ventilated crate for its helicopter ride. And clearly, the crate should be secured on a seat and not simply held by a passenger.

Items used in flight need to be secure and handled safely (Cases 4,8).

If we do need an item in flight then we should recognise it as a hazard and be careful when handling and stowing it. Maps/charts/electronic tablets… These are probably used and handled in flight more than any other item. When we’re not looking at them we can stow them on the left seat (but see above!). Better still is a competent and willing passenger who will hold them and pass them to you when you ask.

An alternative to the left seat is the space between the right seat and door. Case 8 tells us this is not an ideal place to put stuff but at times it’s the only option. If the weight of the map/chart bundle is unevenly distributed then place it with its centre of gravity low. This will make it less likely to pitch forward into the footwell. The tablet, without a cover, is sleek and with little more traction than a wet bar of soap. It’ll need a tacky rubber cover to minimise the chance of it sliding forward as the nose pitches down. This is particularly the case in the R44 in which the door-to-seat gap slopes slightly down towards the footwell.

In fact any electronic device that we’re going to handle in flight should have a cover that we can easily grip. Case 8 shows us the potential risk of dropping a tablet (or anything else) into the footwell.

The risk of handling an item in the cockpit is exemplified by a truly tragic accident involving a Boeing CH-47D (Chinook) during a firefighting operation. “The helicopter was setting up to dip the water bucket in the river when it ascended and subsequently began a left yaw. Once it had turned about 180° the helicopter suddenly pitched nose down. The left yaw rate increased as the helicopter rapidly descended until it impacted the river.” The accident investigation report found the probable cause(s) of the accident to be: “The failure of the flight crew to properly secure a company-issued iPad, leading to its migration into and jamming of the co-pilot’s left pedal, preventing the pilot from arresting a left yaw, and resulting in a loss of control” (3).

In Robinson helicopters, a good safety case can be made for mounting an electronic device to be used in flight to the windscreen or to part of the windscreen surround. It’s then out of the way and we’re not trying to balance it on our left thigh or continually picking it up then re-stowing it. As long as it’s securely mounted this would seem the best option. As long as it’s securely mounted…  A modern version of the GPS aerial mount failing in Case 4 is the failure of a mount holding a tablet or any other electronic device. The good news is I haven’t been able to find an accident caused by this. That’s not to say a mount has never failed, giving the pilot a stressful few moments. It’s probably a good idea to buy a quality aviation-specific mount and to fit it very carefully.

An aside on the subject of suction mounts:

Single piece windscreen? Then beware...

A caution to Guimbal Cabri pilots and perhaps to those flying any helicopter with a single piece windscreen. A Cabri G2 was on an instructional flight with a suction cup mount for a camera installed on the inner centre of the plexiglass windscreen. As the aircraft passed 110 KIAS (near Vne) the windscreen shattered. The safety investigation concluded that the suction cup caused additional stresses on the single piece windscreen and weakened it. The instructor was able to reduce speed and land the G2 safely. The manufacturer issued service letter SL 20-001 A, prohibiting the use of a suction cup mounting on the windscreen (4).   

In an R44? No longer need an item in flight? Then put it in the back. (Case 6).

Make sure before flight that the R44 rear doors and vents doors are closed. The rear can then be used to discard anything no longer needed during flight - jackets, maps, water bottles and so on. They are better in the back than rattling around in the front with the controls and open vents.  

Don’t turn a drama in to a crisis (Cases 6-8). 

In each of Cases 6,7 and 8 the pilots were attempting to reduce the likelihood of an accident by dealing with a loose item in the cockpit. But in doing so they made the situation worse and an accident more likely. Two of the reports commented on this: They were trying to fix a “… not serious problem at an inappropriate time” (Case 7). And “… serves to reinforce the need to resist such actions until they can be conducted safely” (Case 8).

It’s obviously good practice to only do things at an appropriate time, when they can be done safely. Each pilot should have put the helicopter in a safer configuration – perhaps (where airborne) landed, reduced the RPM to Warm-up RPM and put the collective friction on – before turning their attention to the problem item. We know this. At least we do sitting safely in the flying club.

We need to recognise the causes of these accidents – not only the items each pilot brought into the cockpit but the pilot’s response to a perceived threat. Hopefully if we face a similar situation the knowledge of these accidents might just be enough to make us hesitate and re-focus on first flying the helicopter.

But it might not. A perceived threat or something important that we think needs to be dealt with are powerful distractors. And helicopter pilots are human so can easily be diverted and persist in inappropriate actions. This is a threat to aviation far beyond dealing with loose stuff in the cockpit. Beyond just awareness there is more we can do to counter this threat. It will be a topic of a future Helicopter Safety Project Article. 

Sources of information

The Helicopter Safety Project Articles are built with gratitude on the work of others: The air accident investigators and the many pilots who, in the best spirit of promoting aviation safety, spoke candidly about the errors they had made in the accident chain of events. The main source material is air accidents investigation reports published on Government aviation accident investigation sites. For accuracy in summarising each report I’ve stuck closely to the wording used within. At times I’ve presented short pieces of text verbatim and in these cases I’ve put the text in quotation marks. Each investigation report is referenced below and can be viewed by searching the accident number and the aircraft registration via an internet search engine or through the relevant government organisation. As well as the documented reports, in some Articles I've thrown in a lesson learnt from my own experiences of flying and of teaching flying. Where primary research papers and reviews are referenced they can be accessed through PubMed – the search engine on life sciences and biomedical topics maintained by the United States National Library of Medicine.

Air accident Cases:

Case 1:  Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Aviation Safety Investigation report 199000591. Robinson R22, VH-HEU.

Case 2:  Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Aviation Safety Investigation report 199501549. Robinson R22 Beta, VH-JKI. 

Case 3:  Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2014-055. Robinson R22, VH-YPS.

Case 4:  Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Aviation Safety Investigation report 199303206. Robinson R22 Beta. VH-JKK.

Case 5:  South African Civil Aviation Authority, Accident and Incident Investigations Division. Limited Occurrence Investigation Report – Draft. CA18/2/3/10546.  Robinson R44 RII. ZS-RJC.

Case 6:  UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Bulletin 5/2020. Investigation report EW/G2019/10/03. Robinson R44 Raven II, G-LLIZ.

Case 7:  Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Aviation Safety Investigation report 198903794. Robinson R22, VH-NWJ.

Case 8:  UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Bulletin 10/2006. Investigation report EW/G2006/06/04. Robinson R44 Astro, G-RONN.

Other references:

1. UK Civil Aviation Authority Occurrence Listing. 201301617. Robinson R22.

2. Robinson Helicopter Company. Safety Notice SN-30.

3. USA National Transportation Safety Board. Aviation Accident Final Report. Accident number CEN22FA331. Boeing CH-47D. N388RA.  

4.  Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board. Summary report. Guimbal Cabri G2, HB-ZDQ. Linked within: https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/263541 (accessed 6th June 2025).

Aviation Disclaimer

This ‘Article’ is produced by The Helicopter Safety Project (‘we’, ‘us’) on thehelicoptersafetyproject.co.uk. The Article cannot and does not contain aviation advice. The aviation information within the Article is provided in good faith for general informational and educational purposes only and is solely aimed at improving safety during the operation of helicopters. It is not a substitute for professional advice. 

The aviation information does not in any way replace or override the instruction you may receive from a flying instructor at a flying training organisation or from a maintenance technician/engineer at an aircraft maintenance organisation or at an aircraft manufacturer. No information in the Article overrides or supersedes the Pilot’s Operating Handbook and the Flight Manual or other authoritative information published by the manufacturer of the aircraft being flown. Official documentation changes, so the information in the Article might contain technical inaccuracies as a result.

The information, analysis and safety lessons in the Article under no circumstances should be considered to take precedence over the official air accident investigation reports and aviation safety advisory documents published by government organisations. The adoption of the safety lessons is not mandatory, it­ is subject to voluntary commitment and engages only the responsibility of those who endorse these actions.

The information sources listed within the Article are not investigated, monitored, or checked for accuracy, adequacy, validity, reliability, availability, or completeness by us. We do not warrant, endorse, guarantee, or assume responsibility for the accuracy or reliability of any information within these sources.

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